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Sunset Strip
Sep. 4th, 2007 07:08 pmI'm still feeling horribly burnt out. Which is a bit of a pity, because it's 13 weeks before I'm scheduled to go on holiday. I went to bed at 8.15 last night, which did me some good. I still feel uninspired, but at least I don't feel knackered and uninspired. I'll watch a bit of TV tonight and try to get another good night's sleep.
We've only just got the start of the "last nine" Sopranos here in the UK, so that made for a dark hour last night.
Although Studio 60 On Sunset Strip failed to make it past its first series, and although the nature of the show makes me rather unsurprised that it didn't "catch on" (the viewing public needs its illusions...) there was an episode last week (number 6 in the series, "The Wrap Party") which was up there with the best episode of a drama series, ever. Not only did it have three girly airheads who couldn't grasp that the people who appeared on the show (a kind of "Saturday Night Live") were working from a script ("Wow, there's (insert name of comedian on show)! Do you know him?" "Yes, he works for me. He says my lines. That's what an executive producer and head writer does. He writes the lines". "Wow, so you actually KNOW him?!!!!")
but it also had a main plot where an old guy is caught stealing a picture from backstage. They take him to a room and ask for his name, but he appears to give three names. It takes an old sage to spot that these are actually six names, six of the "Hollywood Ten". Gradually they uncover who this guy was -- a scriptwriter in the 1950s who had been blacklisted. But, and here's the coup (because I didn't recognize the guy), it was actually Eli Wallach playing this old guy. And, as anyone up on McCarthyism will know, Eli Wallach was blacklisted as an actor in the 1950s.
Top marks.
__________
Hurricane hits Nicaragua and Honduras. Indiginous Indian tribe wiped out. Land developers cheer; no-one else really gives a shit. When you look at these people's lands, and at Miami. Well, which one would you rather see hit?
__________
I see that Bat For Lashes (Natasha Khan) is favourite for the Mercury Prize. Oddly, I actually hope that she wins it, even though you know it's all part of the hype industry. I haven't even heard the album, but what I saw of the Glastonbury live performance was enough. Of course, if The Enemy had been nominated, things would be different.
Amy Winehouse is so self-starringly on a self-destruct route that it's reminiscent of watching Roswell talk of his poker exploits a few years ago, a car crash in devastating slow motion. Then again, I suppose that Bluescouse is the more modern equivalent.
_________
I continue to read Professional No Limit Hold'em and I continue to be uncomfortable with it. I think part of the problem is that it makes a number of implicit assumptions. Some of these the authors realize they are making (I guess through the mutual proofing process) and this has led to a plethora of footnotes and parenthesized exceptions. What the guys are saying is good; I can see what they are getting at. But I really think that to exploit what is being written requires a nose for the game, and that anyone using what's recommended as a basic "rote" on which to develop their game, will get into big trouble.
Let's take a simple "implicit assumption". I've got this by opening the book at random.
"Once you are committed, you can no longer be bluffed".
This implicitly assumes that you are against opponents who may bluff. Some multi-tabling nits never bluff. The closest you can get to a bluff from them is a semi-bluff with lots of outs. So, if you say "but I'm in a game where no-one bluffs" their only response can be "nonsense. that game does not exist". So, implicit in this game plan is that you are up against "tricky" opponents.
A second implicit assumption is that if you put in a third or more of your stack, and then fold, then you have done something wrong. Now, I tend to agree with this in the sense that it's something that you want to avoid, but it is not implicitly wrong and it does not de facto imply that you did something wrong earlier on. I'm sure that there's a footnote exception to this statement, somewhere (probably relating to a scare turn card appearing), but there are a number of players where you can call for a third of your stack, knowing from their style that if they fire the final bullet on the river (laying you 2-to-1) they have the best hand.
So, suppose you both have $110 left after the flop and there is $10 in the pot. Opponent puts in $10 on the flop and you reckon that you are 70:30 to be winning here in a way-ahead way-behind situation (so if you raise and you are losing, he will reraise you, whereas if you raise and you are winning, he will fold). You call. On the turn he bets $30 and the same applies. You call. The river comes and he checks 70% of the time (when he is losing) and bets the pot 30% of the time (when he is winning). You can either check or value-bet here (if you do, he folds a loser and calls a winner). You have put in a third of your stack. 70% of the time you win $50 (his two bets plus the $10 in the pot) and 30% of the time you lose $40, for a net average gain of $23 per hand. You can't beat this net gain (if you raise the flop and he folds, you only win $20, but if he reraises you lose the same. If you raise the turn you win your $50 70% of the time, but lose more than $40 the times you are behind), but by the PNLHE principles, because you have put in more than a third of your stack, you have made a mistake.
I think that part of my problem is the games that I play. I have a feeling that this advice might be very good for more agressive short-handed games at $400 or above. But, as the authors admit: "it's the SPR that makes you the most money when you get all-in" and they follow this with "they do not necessarily maximize your earn when you do not get all-in".
I just played 210 hands on Party and I got all-in once. I put short-stacked opponents all-in four times. I think that I am getting myself all-in (or nearly so) no more than once every 300 to 400 hands. The authors state somewhere in the second half of the book that you make more money from your all-in pots because these are the bigger pots, therefore it's worthwhile going for the maximised profit when you get all-in.
Once again, this may be true (although it isn't if th3e all-ins area only against the short stacks), but once again it makes an implicit assumption -- that being, that there will be enough big pots when you get all-in to outweigh the many small pots you win where you don't get all-in.
I note that, tucked away on page 250, the authors state the following:
On the same page, they say (quite honestly, and I paraphrase slightly) that "That brings us to a conclusion that we would rather not give", that there isn't much you can do about making post-flop decisions easy with top pair hands if you are playing a 100BB stack. They follow this up with "that's not to say that you should play a 40BB stack instead of 130BB or some other size", but they don't go on to say why.
Once again, I really think that they give some useful stuff here, but the unwary reader (who misses the codicil on page 250) might approach every pot from this all-in potential. There are many tight tables that you get during the afternoon where no-one is capable of the ultimate weapon -- the third barrel for all the money on a complete bluff. Once you know this, the whole ballgame changes. But, can you know this, you might ask?
Well, obviously not. All you can do is look at thousands and thousands of hands and say to yourself "well, I haven't seen one yet, but perhaps, like the Black Swan, it's out there". But there seem to be a lot of afternoon players out there waiting for that "wow I'm committed!" all-in hand, and then they put their bet in on the turn, and they don't get paid off.
So, I guess part of my point is that I'm not enamoured with the "being committed is good, because you can't be bluffed" kind of line. I can see what they are getting at, but they've expressed it badly. Somewhat jocularly, I thought of replying to the line on 246 ...
with "that's simple. You call him when you are beating him and you fold when he is beating you. If you can't read your opponent accutrately more than 50% of the time, you shouldn't be playing".
Worse, if your SPR says that you are committed, but your read on your opponent tells you that you are beaten, you have a conflicting situation.
There seems to be a fad for making your own decisions easy rather than difficult. Well, just fold all those big cards that are likely to flop a single pair with reverse implied odds (and the concomitant "difficult decisions"). Stick to hands that are "fit or fold". But I don't think that's the best way to play, and neither do the authors. They admit that you have to play hands that give you difficult decisions (see page 250). The whole thing kind of unravels here. Which is a pity because, as I say, much of what they write is very helpful. I just wish that it had been better structured.
We've only just got the start of the "last nine" Sopranos here in the UK, so that made for a dark hour last night.
Although Studio 60 On Sunset Strip failed to make it past its first series, and although the nature of the show makes me rather unsurprised that it didn't "catch on" (the viewing public needs its illusions...) there was an episode last week (number 6 in the series, "The Wrap Party") which was up there with the best episode of a drama series, ever. Not only did it have three girly airheads who couldn't grasp that the people who appeared on the show (a kind of "Saturday Night Live") were working from a script ("Wow, there's (insert name of comedian on show)! Do you know him?" "Yes, he works for me. He says my lines. That's what an executive producer and head writer does. He writes the lines". "Wow, so you actually KNOW him?!!!!")
but it also had a main plot where an old guy is caught stealing a picture from backstage. They take him to a room and ask for his name, but he appears to give three names. It takes an old sage to spot that these are actually six names, six of the "Hollywood Ten". Gradually they uncover who this guy was -- a scriptwriter in the 1950s who had been blacklisted. But, and here's the coup (because I didn't recognize the guy), it was actually Eli Wallach playing this old guy. And, as anyone up on McCarthyism will know, Eli Wallach was blacklisted as an actor in the 1950s.
Top marks.
__________
Hurricane hits Nicaragua and Honduras. Indiginous Indian tribe wiped out. Land developers cheer; no-one else really gives a shit. When you look at these people's lands, and at Miami. Well, which one would you rather see hit?
__________
I see that Bat For Lashes (Natasha Khan) is favourite for the Mercury Prize. Oddly, I actually hope that she wins it, even though you know it's all part of the hype industry. I haven't even heard the album, but what I saw of the Glastonbury live performance was enough. Of course, if The Enemy had been nominated, things would be different.
Amy Winehouse is so self-starringly on a self-destruct route that it's reminiscent of watching Roswell talk of his poker exploits a few years ago, a car crash in devastating slow motion. Then again, I suppose that Bluescouse is the more modern equivalent.
_________
I continue to read Professional No Limit Hold'em and I continue to be uncomfortable with it. I think part of the problem is that it makes a number of implicit assumptions. Some of these the authors realize they are making (I guess through the mutual proofing process) and this has led to a plethora of footnotes and parenthesized exceptions. What the guys are saying is good; I can see what they are getting at. But I really think that to exploit what is being written requires a nose for the game, and that anyone using what's recommended as a basic "rote" on which to develop their game, will get into big trouble.
Let's take a simple "implicit assumption". I've got this by opening the book at random.
"Once you are committed, you can no longer be bluffed".
This implicitly assumes that you are against opponents who may bluff. Some multi-tabling nits never bluff. The closest you can get to a bluff from them is a semi-bluff with lots of outs. So, if you say "but I'm in a game where no-one bluffs" their only response can be "nonsense. that game does not exist". So, implicit in this game plan is that you are up against "tricky" opponents.
A second implicit assumption is that if you put in a third or more of your stack, and then fold, then you have done something wrong. Now, I tend to agree with this in the sense that it's something that you want to avoid, but it is not implicitly wrong and it does not de facto imply that you did something wrong earlier on. I'm sure that there's a footnote exception to this statement, somewhere (probably relating to a scare turn card appearing), but there are a number of players where you can call for a third of your stack, knowing from their style that if they fire the final bullet on the river (laying you 2-to-1) they have the best hand.
So, suppose you both have $110 left after the flop and there is $10 in the pot. Opponent puts in $10 on the flop and you reckon that you are 70:30 to be winning here in a way-ahead way-behind situation (so if you raise and you are losing, he will reraise you, whereas if you raise and you are winning, he will fold). You call. On the turn he bets $30 and the same applies. You call. The river comes and he checks 70% of the time (when he is losing) and bets the pot 30% of the time (when he is winning). You can either check or value-bet here (if you do, he folds a loser and calls a winner). You have put in a third of your stack. 70% of the time you win $50 (his two bets plus the $10 in the pot) and 30% of the time you lose $40, for a net average gain of $23 per hand. You can't beat this net gain (if you raise the flop and he folds, you only win $20, but if he reraises you lose the same. If you raise the turn you win your $50 70% of the time, but lose more than $40 the times you are behind), but by the PNLHE principles, because you have put in more than a third of your stack, you have made a mistake.
I think that part of my problem is the games that I play. I have a feeling that this advice might be very good for more agressive short-handed games at $400 or above. But, as the authors admit: "it's the SPR that makes you the most money when you get all-in" and they follow this with "they do not necessarily maximize your earn when you do not get all-in".
I just played 210 hands on Party and I got all-in once. I put short-stacked opponents all-in four times. I think that I am getting myself all-in (or nearly so) no more than once every 300 to 400 hands. The authors state somewhere in the second half of the book that you make more money from your all-in pots because these are the bigger pots, therefore it's worthwhile going for the maximised profit when you get all-in.
Once again, this may be true (although it isn't if th3e all-ins area only against the short stacks), but once again it makes an implicit assumption -- that being, that there will be enough big pots when you get all-in to outweigh the many small pots you win where you don't get all-in.
I note that, tucked away on page 250, the authors state the following:
If you rarely face commitment decisions or get all-in, SPR techniques won't apply for the vast majority of your hands.Surely this merits greater emphasis?
On the same page, they say (quite honestly, and I paraphrase slightly) that "That brings us to a conclusion that we would rather not give", that there isn't much you can do about making post-flop decisions easy with top pair hands if you are playing a 100BB stack. They follow this up with "that's not to say that you should play a 40BB stack instead of 130BB or some other size", but they don't go on to say why.
Once again, I really think that they give some useful stuff here, but the unwary reader (who misses the codicil on page 250) might approach every pot from this all-in potential. There are many tight tables that you get during the afternoon where no-one is capable of the ultimate weapon -- the third barrel for all the money on a complete bluff. Once you know this, the whole ballgame changes. But, can you know this, you might ask?
Well, obviously not. All you can do is look at thousands and thousands of hands and say to yourself "well, I haven't seen one yet, but perhaps, like the Black Swan, it's out there". But there seem to be a lot of afternoon players out there waiting for that "wow I'm committed!" all-in hand, and then they put their bet in on the turn, and they don't get paid off.
So, I guess part of my point is that I'm not enamoured with the "being committed is good, because you can't be bluffed" kind of line. I can see what they are getting at, but they've expressed it badly. Somewhat jocularly, I thought of replying to the line on 246 ...
"You flop an overpair, and your opponent moves in on you. Before SPR, you may not have known what to do"
with "that's simple. You call him when you are beating him and you fold when he is beating you. If you can't read your opponent accutrately more than 50% of the time, you shouldn't be playing".
Worse, if your SPR says that you are committed, but your read on your opponent tells you that you are beaten, you have a conflicting situation.
There seems to be a fad for making your own decisions easy rather than difficult. Well, just fold all those big cards that are likely to flop a single pair with reverse implied odds (and the concomitant "difficult decisions"). Stick to hands that are "fit or fold". But I don't think that's the best way to play, and neither do the authors. They admit that you have to play hands that give you difficult decisions (see page 250). The whole thing kind of unravels here. Which is a pity because, as I say, much of what they write is very helpful. I just wish that it had been better structured.
