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More On Brown
Sep. 18th, 2006 11:22 pmEarly on in Aaron Brown's "Poker Face Of Wall Street", Brown approaches the problematic area of calling.
Brown has a, shall we say, "typical" American view of calling, one with which I tend to agree. This is that you need to have a good reason for calling. Summed up in a nutshell, his line is "if you are unsure, it's almost always better to fold or raise".
Brown sees only three reasons for calling. The first is when you are getting pot odds. The second is when you think you are getting implied odds, and the third is when you want other players to stay in the pot.
His line sounds eminently reasonable, and I can see keen young bucks eagerly embracing the concept, and then sitting down in a European game with what appears to be a fleet of calling stations, and our raising/folding machine gets slaughtered.
Why? Because although one thoughtless caller gets himself into grief, eight of them cause the lone raiser or folder a lot of trouble.
Brown's line also suffers a bit if you apply a reductio ad absurdum. As we know, a check is actually a call when no-one has yet put in any money, while a bet is a raise when no-one has yet put in any money.
Following the above reasoning, the only reason to check is if any new money has a negative expectation (which, given potential fold equity, is less often than you think) or when you want other players to stay in the pot (i.e., you are slow-playing).
If everyone followed this line, there wouldn't be much checking going on.
And yet, if you watch the top games, there is a lot of checking, and there's a lot of calling as well.
So what is going on? Clearly, somewhere, there is something missing in the Brown analysis. I have seen good players cold-call raises on the button (in limit, pot limit and no limit) where none of the above reasons supplied by Brown apply.
Of course, Brown can reply "ahh, but these are not thoughtless calls. These are good players, therefore their calls must have a reason behind them". But this is a circular argument.
If we look at the high-stakes short-handed games (it matters not what the game is), then it feels as if you have sat down amongst some Brown disciples. The general principle is "if I'm in, I'm raising". And, just as the lone raiser has horrible problems when faced with eight calling opponents pre-flop, one of whom will stick to the end and, probably, win, so the "sensible" player will get ripped apart by three opponents who don't know where the call button is.
So, where's the flaw in Brown's view?
Well, since I tend to agree with his line of thought (it's many years since I decided that limping first in had virtually no merits in limit hold 'em -- a view that I have adjusted in a few minor areas since, but to which I still generally hold) it's hard for me to find the flaw. But how's this for a hypothesis.
A major mistake is the player who has a hand where he can't decide what to do between three choices, so he sees the call as a "compromise" between a raise and a fold. This is nearly always a mistake,with the call being the worst choice of the three.
However, there are other situations where a raise might be right, a call might be right, and a fold might be right, and the call is the best decision, but only marginally. I think that Brown is confusing this second scenario with the above scenario -- mainly because they look superficially similar. In both cases the player is not sure what the right decision is, and in both cases there is a choice of three.
The difference is, in the first case, the hand is something like 75s one off the button with one limper in a reasonably aggressive game. If you raise here you get control of the hand. If you fold, you get out for nothing. If you limp, you are praying that neither the button nor either of the blinds will raise it. And, even if they don't, you need to hit the flop. And if you get a drawing hand, you are praying that you will be able to see the turn cheaply.
In the second case, you might be last to act. If you raise, you might get the free card that you want to hit a mediocre flush and a gutshot straight, but you also risk a three-bet. If you call, you are getting pot odds if your flush is good, but not if there is a higher flush out there or if one of the players has a redraw to the nut flush. If the latter is the case, then a fold is correct.
So, any one of three decisions could be correct, but in this case the call is not a "compromise". It has its own validity. But Brown would tend to recommend raising or folding here (from the spirit of his text), because you do not have a darned good reason for calling. The decision is marginal.
When you get a lot of players making calls pre-flop (as in our hypothetical European game) the actions of the callers reinforces the correctness of the callers and marginalises the raiser and folder. It's a bit like the early stages of a tournament amongst a bunch of passive players who don't really know what they are doing. Suddenly, hands that you would either pump or dump, become worth calling with (first because you are getting pot odds and implied odds, and second beause you are less likely to get raised behind you). Meanwhile the raiser is at more of a disadvantage, because he is less likely to get a hand like AToff in late up against one opponent.
Brown has a, shall we say, "typical" American view of calling, one with which I tend to agree. This is that you need to have a good reason for calling. Summed up in a nutshell, his line is "if you are unsure, it's almost always better to fold or raise".
Brown sees only three reasons for calling. The first is when you are getting pot odds. The second is when you think you are getting implied odds, and the third is when you want other players to stay in the pot.
His line sounds eminently reasonable, and I can see keen young bucks eagerly embracing the concept, and then sitting down in a European game with what appears to be a fleet of calling stations, and our raising/folding machine gets slaughtered.
Why? Because although one thoughtless caller gets himself into grief, eight of them cause the lone raiser or folder a lot of trouble.
Brown's line also suffers a bit if you apply a reductio ad absurdum. As we know, a check is actually a call when no-one has yet put in any money, while a bet is a raise when no-one has yet put in any money.
Following the above reasoning, the only reason to check is if any new money has a negative expectation (which, given potential fold equity, is less often than you think) or when you want other players to stay in the pot (i.e., you are slow-playing).
If everyone followed this line, there wouldn't be much checking going on.
And yet, if you watch the top games, there is a lot of checking, and there's a lot of calling as well.
So what is going on? Clearly, somewhere, there is something missing in the Brown analysis. I have seen good players cold-call raises on the button (in limit, pot limit and no limit) where none of the above reasons supplied by Brown apply.
Of course, Brown can reply "ahh, but these are not thoughtless calls. These are good players, therefore their calls must have a reason behind them". But this is a circular argument.
If we look at the high-stakes short-handed games (it matters not what the game is), then it feels as if you have sat down amongst some Brown disciples. The general principle is "if I'm in, I'm raising". And, just as the lone raiser has horrible problems when faced with eight calling opponents pre-flop, one of whom will stick to the end and, probably, win, so the "sensible" player will get ripped apart by three opponents who don't know where the call button is.
So, where's the flaw in Brown's view?
Well, since I tend to agree with his line of thought (it's many years since I decided that limping first in had virtually no merits in limit hold 'em -- a view that I have adjusted in a few minor areas since, but to which I still generally hold) it's hard for me to find the flaw. But how's this for a hypothesis.
A major mistake is the player who has a hand where he can't decide what to do between three choices, so he sees the call as a "compromise" between a raise and a fold. This is nearly always a mistake,with the call being the worst choice of the three.
However, there are other situations where a raise might be right, a call might be right, and a fold might be right, and the call is the best decision, but only marginally. I think that Brown is confusing this second scenario with the above scenario -- mainly because they look superficially similar. In both cases the player is not sure what the right decision is, and in both cases there is a choice of three.
The difference is, in the first case, the hand is something like 75s one off the button with one limper in a reasonably aggressive game. If you raise here you get control of the hand. If you fold, you get out for nothing. If you limp, you are praying that neither the button nor either of the blinds will raise it. And, even if they don't, you need to hit the flop. And if you get a drawing hand, you are praying that you will be able to see the turn cheaply.
In the second case, you might be last to act. If you raise, you might get the free card that you want to hit a mediocre flush and a gutshot straight, but you also risk a three-bet. If you call, you are getting pot odds if your flush is good, but not if there is a higher flush out there or if one of the players has a redraw to the nut flush. If the latter is the case, then a fold is correct.
So, any one of three decisions could be correct, but in this case the call is not a "compromise". It has its own validity. But Brown would tend to recommend raising or folding here (from the spirit of his text), because you do not have a darned good reason for calling. The decision is marginal.
When you get a lot of players making calls pre-flop (as in our hypothetical European game) the actions of the callers reinforces the correctness of the callers and marginalises the raiser and folder. It's a bit like the early stages of a tournament amongst a bunch of passive players who don't really know what they are doing. Suddenly, hands that you would either pump or dump, become worth calling with (first because you are getting pot odds and implied odds, and second beause you are less likely to get raised behind you). Meanwhile the raiser is at more of a disadvantage, because he is less likely to get a hand like AToff in late up against one opponent.
